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We review evidence on the Great Moderation in conjunction with evidence about 
volatility trends at the micro level.  We combine the two types of evidence to develop a 
tentative story for important components of the aggregate volatility decline and its 
consequences.   The key ingredients of the story are declines in firm-level volatility and 
aggregate volatility – most dramatically in the durable goods sector – but the absence of a 
decline in the volatility of household consumption and individual earnings.  Our 
explanation for volatility reduction stresses improved supply chain management, 
particularly in the durable goods sector, and a shift in production and employment from 
goods to services. We also provide some evidence for a specific mechanism, namely 
shorter lead times for materials orders. The tentative conclusion we draw is that, although 
better supply chain management involves potentially large efficiency gains with first-
order effects on welfare, it does not imply (nor is there much evidence for) a reduction in 
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The decline of volatility in real economic activity over the past 50 years in the 
advanced economies is striking.  Volatility reductions are evident for output, employment 
and productivity at the aggregate level and across industrial sectors and expenditure 
categories.  Previous studies advance several potential explanations for this “Great 
Moderation.”  Some credit improved monetary policy for reductions in the volatility of 
both real activity and inflation (e.g. Clarida, et al., 2000).  Others suggest that financial 
innovation and increased global integration play a role (Dynan et al., 2006).  Still others, 
pointing to evidence that output volatility fell more than sales volatility, highlight the 
potential role of technological change in the form of better inventory control methods 
(e.g., Kahn et al. 2002).  Another line of research (e.g., Stock and Watson, 2002) stresses 
“good luck” in the form of less volatility in exogenous driving forces. 
These explanations are not mutually exclusive.  As Bernanke (2004) remarks in 
his discussion of the Great Moderation: “Explanations of complicated phenomena are 
rarely clear cut and simple, and each … probably contains elements of truth.”  The main 
elements can also interact in complicated ways.  Perhaps, for example, the unsuccessful 
monetary policy of the 1970s or the more successful policy that followed facilitated the 
spread of volatility-reducing financial innovations.  Or, perhaps sound monetary policy is 
easier when shocks are milder.  Nonetheless, even if no single factor fully explains the 
phenomenon, it is useful to amass evidence for and against particular hypotheses. 
We consider a variety of evidence related to The Great Moderation, drawing 
mainly on U.S. data, and work towards a story with a few key themes.  Unlike most 
research on the topic, we consider volatility behavior at the micro level for clues about 
the sources and consequences of aggregate volatility changes.  As it turns out, the micro 
story is complex.  The average volatility of firm-level employment growth fell after the 
early 1980s but trended in opposite directions for publicly traded and privately held firms 
(Davis et al. 2006).  In financial data, the variance in the idiosyncratic component of 
firm-level equity returns more than doubled from 1962 to 1997 (Campbell et al. 2001).  
However, this trend largely reflects an influx of increasingly risky new listings (Fama and 
French, 2004, Brown and Kapadia, 2007).  At the individual level, several indicators 
point to a large decline in the risk of unwanted job loss since the early 1980s (Davis, 
2007).  However, when we consider household-level consumption changes, we find no   2
evidence for a decline in volatility after the 1980s.  The available evidence on individual 
earnings uncertainty points to a longer term rise, not a decline. 
We begin with some facts about the Great Moderation and a review of the 
macroeconomics literature.  We then turn to evidence from micro data.  We review the 
short, and volatile, history of thought on the evolution of microeconomic volatility, and 
describe some new work on household consumption data.  With that as background, we 
then return to the macroeconomic arena and try to piece together a coherent story.  As 
partial explanations for the Great Moderation, our story stresses improved supply chain 
management, particularly in the durable goods sector, and a shift in production and 
employment activity from goods to services. We also provide some evidence for a 
specific mechanism, namely shorter lead times for materials orders. The last part of the 
paper describes a model of improved inventory control that is broadly consistent with the 
facts about reduced volatility in the durable goods sector, and also provides some 
evidence for a specific mechanism, namely shorter lead times for materials orders.  
 
I.  Reduced Volatility of Aggregates 
An abrupt drop in the volatility of U.S. real GDP growth in the early 1980s 
(Figure 1) provided the initial impetus for research on The Great Moderation.  Early 
findings of a discrete break in volatility around 1983 (McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 
2000) encouraged a focus on comparisons before and after 1983.  This approach conceals 
the fact that many economic series did not undergo an abrupt volatility drop around 1983. 
Some did so much earlier, some later.  The “sudden drop” view also directs attention 
away from certain developments that perhaps play an important role in the long term 
decline of volatility.  Structural shifts in the economy, e.g., a rising share of services in 
aggregate output, are unlikely to produce an abrupt drop in aggregate volatility.   
We argue, echoing Blanchard and Simon (2001) somewhat, that the suddenness 
of the volatility drop is more apparent than real—that, in fact, large shocks in the 1970s 
and a deep contraction in the early 1980s obscure longer term developments that 
contributed to a downward drift in volatility even before the 1980s.  Figure 2 provides 
some evidence on this issue, showing quarterly annualized growth rates for the four 
NIPA sectors that comprise GDP: nondurable goods, durable goods, services, and   3
structures.  Each is scaled by its nominal share of GDP so that the magnitudes (in terms 
of growth contributions) are comparable, and the scale of the charts is the same as in 
Figure 1.  It is clear from these figures that only in the durable goods sector did volatility 
change in much the same way—both in terms of magnitude and timing—as GDP.  
Nondurables output volatility dropped, but it had also been lower in the 1960s before 
increasing in the 1970s, and in any case it was never anywhere nearly as volatile as 
durables.  Thus the decline—such as it was—is unlikely to have been a major factor in 
the stabilization of the early 1980s.   Service sector output was also never nearly as 
volatile as durable goods output, and moreover, its volatility dropped substantially in the 
early 1960s, and again in the 1970s, long before the break in GDP volatility.  Structures 
output did experience a drop in volatility at the same time as overall GDP, but the size of 
the sector and the magnitude of the contribution is modest.
1 
Thus both in magnitude and timing, the drop in GDP volatility appears most 
closely related to developments in the durable goods sector.  This is further illustrated in 
Figure 3, the top half of which plots rolling 5-year variances for the same four sectors and 
GDP, along with a “covariance” term reflecting the variance of GDP not accounted for 
by the variances of the sectors.  This figure also makes clear that both for total GDP and 
especially for durables, the volatility decline in the early 1980s was an acceleration of a 
trend that dates back to World War II.  Only the durables sector volatility exhibits a 
downward trend on the order of that followed by overall GDP volatility.  The bottom half 
of Figure 3 shows the analogous chart for GDP volatility broken down by expenditure 
categories.  Prominent in the evolution of volatility is the inventory investment term and 
the covariance term. 
Figure 3 is just accounting, and does not prove cause and effect.  It is possible that 
the decline in GDP volatility also caused the decline in durables sector volatility, or in 
inventory investment volatility, or that both had a common cause.  Still, a challenge for 
any explanation of the overall decline in GDP volatility is to account for the specific 
patterns observed in this figure, as well as the more detailed facts regarding inventories 
and durable goods found below in Sections III and VI below. 
                                                 
1 Note that the volatility contributions depicted in the charts are also affected by trends in sector shares over 
time, but the effect is very slight.  The pictures would look virtually identical if sector shares were held 
constant.     4
A question that frequently arises about the reduction in GDP volatility is the 
extent to which secular shifts in sector shares could account for declines in volatility.  
While it is true that the less volatile sectors such as services have grown over time 
relative to the more volatile goods sectors.   It turns out, however, that at least as a far as 
these broad aggregates are concerned, the sectoral shift toward services plays only a 
modest role in the reduction of overall volatility.  Specifically, if we reconstruct GDP 
growth fixing the sector shares at their values for a particular year, we get volatility 
reductions almost as large as in the raw data, and following similar patterns.  Table 1 
shows the results of this exercise using 1959 shares:  The raw decline in GDP volatility 
using 1984Q1 as the break date is 1.97 percent, while with sector shares fixed at their 
1959 values, the decline is 1.75 percent.  Thus only about one-tenth of the decline is 
explained by sectoral shifts.  Of course, this does not rule out shifts within the sectors we 
examine.  We will examine this issue in the next draft, exploiting more finely 
disaggregated data. 
  
II. Financial Markets 
To be written. 
 
III. Inventory Behavior 
Another potentially important fact about the Great Moderation is that output 
volatility fell by substantially more than (and earlier than) final sales volatility, 
particularly in the durable goods sector.
2   Since the difference between output and final 
sales is the change in inventories, this fact implies a change in inventory behavior—either 
a reduction in the volatility of inventory investment, or a change in the covariance 
between inventory investment and sales.  Note that by convention, the service and 
structures sector do not carry inventories (in structures this is because final output 
includes construction in progress), so the source of the change in inventory behavior must 
by definition lie in the goods sector.
3  Figure 4 shows the behavior of output and sales 
                                                 
2 See McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Kahn et al. (2002). 
3 There is, however, evidence of a change in inventory behavior in construction, even though it is not 
treated as such in the NIPAs.  See Kahn (2000).   5
volatility over time in the durable goods sector.  In contrast to the behavior of output 
volatility, sales volatility shows only a modest decline.
4  
Given our focus on the volatility of real growth rates (as opposed to levels), we 
can examine a similar relationship between output, inventories and sales in terms of 
growth contributions.  Although inventory investment, because it can be negative, does 
not have a conventionally defined growth contribution, we can define it indirectly as the 
difference between the growth rate of output and the growth contribution of final sales 
(cf. Kahn et al, 2002).  Following Whelan (2000) we can approximate the latter in terms 
of the real growth rate of sales and the nominal share of sales in output.  Letting  xy γ  
denote the growth contribution of x to output y, where x = s for sales and x = i for 
inventories, we define the growth contribution of inventory investment as  
  iy yy sy γ γγ ≡ −  
where  sys s s y γ γθ = ,    sy θ  is the nominal share of s in y (measured as the average of current 
and lagged shares).  The growth contribution of a variable to itself is just its real growth 
rate. 
  With these definitions in hand, we can track the contributions of sales and 
inventory investment to the variance of output growth over time: 
 
222 2 ysi s i σ σσ σ =++  
where the variances and covariance on the right-hand side refer to the growth 
contributions defined above.  Figure 5 plots the three components for the durable goods 
sector.  We see that both the inventory term and the covariance term exhibit a substantial 
downward trend, with the covariance term accounting in particular for the big drop in the 
early 1980s.  Thus not only is the apparent break in 1984 associated with a change in 
inventory behavior, but the downward trend from the 1950s onward is as well. 
  
IV. Inflation Moderation 
In addition to the apparent break in volatility around 1983, that year is also often 
viewed as a turning point in monetary policy, the beginning of the Volcker-Greenspan era 
                                                 
4  McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) find evidence of a statistically significant break in the mid-1980s in 
durables output but not in final sales.   6
of low and stable inflation.  A large literature, led by Clarida et al (2000), has debated the 
extent to which there was a change in monetary policy regime, one that had the effect of 
reducing both inflation and output volatility.   For it to do both requires not just a more 
aggressively anti-inflationary policy, which according to traditional policy analysis would 
actually increase output volatility, but a superior policy that shifts the locus of the 
tradeoff.   
It is worth noting that low and stable inflation is not a post-1983 phenomenon.  
Inflation volatility in the period from 1955 to 1969 was almost as low as it was after 1983 
(See Figure 6).  Yet output volatility was relatively high.  This does not necessarily refute 
the “better policy” hypothesis, but it requires a more complicated story.  The low 
inflation volatility/high output volatility combination of the earlier period could be 
consistent with a more anti-inflation policy stance, but still with policy rules or responses 
that were inefficient relative to those of the post-1983 era.  If one envisions a tradeoff 
between inflation and output volatility, this view would represent the 1950s and early 
1960s as choosing a low-inflation point on that tradeoff, whereas the Greenspan-Volcker 
era policies actually shifted the terms of the tradeoff, allowing lower volatility of both 
output and inflation. 
But while one can tell such a story, there is little evidence to support it.  Romer 
and Romer (2002a, 2002b), in fact, argue that policy in the 1950s was similar to policy in 
the 1990s.  Moreover, if one considers the more detailed breakdown of volatility declines 
discussed thus far,  it becomes even more difficult to tell a story that gives a great deal of 
weight to improved monetary policy.  As argued in Kahn et al (2002), such a story would 
have to explain why improved monetary policy would affect one sector more than 
another, and output volatility differently from sales volatility.  No doubt it is possible to 
construct models that have these implications, given the greater interest sensitivity of 
durable goods demand, but a quantitative case for the ability of a monetary model to 
explain these facts has yet to be made. 
One argument in favor of the “better policy” hypothesis is that it is potentially the 
one story most compatible with a discrete change such as researchers have found in the 
volatility data.  Technical progress associated with improved inventory management is 
unlikely to have been implemented suddenly.   Financial innovation was a gradual   7
process, even if there were discrete events such as the development of new securities or 
the opening of a new type of market.  Of course, one discrete event that undoubtedly 
contributed to reduced volatility in the structures sector was the phaseout of Regulation 
Q’s interest rate ceilings in the early 1980’s as part of the Monetary Control Act of 1980 
(see, for example, Bernanke, 2007).   The limits on interest on deposits made credit 
availability to the housing sector (which was especially dependent on this source of 
funds) highly sensitive to increases in market interest rates, and thus to contractionary 
monetary policy.  As argued above, however, the structures sector, and residential 
construction in particular, was too small to make much of a dent in the overall volatility 
of GDP.  Finally, the “good luck” hypothesis does not have a structural story behind it (it 
being really a sort of residual hypothesis that remains standing when more specific 
models fail to explain the data).  To be compelling, the “good luck” hypothesis requires 
support in the form of reduced volatility in identifiable, measurable and arguably 
exogenous disturbances. 
Monetary policy, on the other hand, can certainly be subject to sudden changes in 
“regime.”  In the last 20 years, for example, many central banks around the world have 
adopted “inflation targeting” regimes that represent a discrete departure from earlier 
policies.  In October 1979 the Federal Reserve under Volcker shifted from targeting the 
Federal Funds rate to targeting non-borrowed reserves, a regime that lasted until 1983.  A 
number of studies (e.g. Clarida et al, 2000) provide evidence that the interest rate 
targeting regimes pre-1979 and post-1983 were fundamentally different, the former 
resulting in both inflation and output instability.   
Nonetheless, the evidence of the importance of such regime shifts is ambiguous.  
Sims and Zha (2006) argue that changes in monetary policy regimes were relatively 
inconsequential, and in any case do not line up very well with changes in volatility.  In a 
series of papers, Athanasios (e.g. 2002) argues that the policy regime of the 1970’s was 
not fundamentally different, but was hit with large structural changes (a higher “natural” 
unemployment rate, lower trend productivity growth) for which it had limited and 
imperfect information in real time.   
There are, moreover, good reasons to doubt the hypothesis that a sudden regime 
shift in monetary policy is responsible for the discrete drop in volatility post-1983.    8
Modern research on monetary policy points to a variety of factors that influence the 
efficacy of monetary policy.  These include the credibility of the policymaker, 
transparency, and the commitment to rules (as opposed to maintaining discretion).  While 
with the benefit of hindsight, the Volcker-Greenspan era represents a discrete break with 
the immediate past (though as argued earlier, perhaps not with the policies of the 1950s 
and early 60s), nonetheless it is asking a lot to believe that enhanced credibility was 
achieved overnight.  In addition, increased transparency has been an evolutionary 
process.  The FOMC only began making public its interest rate target decisions in 1994.  
Only in 1998 did the committee begin releasing statements explaining its policy 
decisions, and the informational content of these statements has continued to evolve.  
Finally, the FOMC has yet to adopt an explicit inflation target, make its economic 
forecasts public, or move toward any semblance of an explicit policy rule. 
At the same time, there is no question that in many important ways, monetary 
policy is more transparent.  The statements released with the announcement of decisions 
are increasingly substantive and informative, the minutes of the FOMC meetings are now 
released sooner after the meeting than in the past, and public statements by the Chairman 
and committee members have undoubtedly reduced the opaqueness of policy.  There is 
wealth of evidence that uncertainty about future inflation has been substantially reduced 
[citations].  In view of all this, there is little doubt that monetary policy has advanced 
considerably in the last 25 years.  But the contention that there was a discrete and 
substantial break in 1983 that can explain a discrete drop in volatility beginning in the 
early 1980s is dubious at best. 
On the other hand, the evidence described earlier indicates that to some extent the 
break in volatility in the early 1980s may be a red herring.  A broader view suggests that 
aggregate volatility has both a trend and cyclical component, and that the trend has been 
downward (though, as argued by Blanchard and Simon, 2001, interrupted by the 
turbulent 1970’s) throughout the postwar era, perhaps leveling out since the mid-1980s.  
Note that in Figure 3, the volatility troughs, which tended to occur toward the beginning 
of lengthy expansions, are successively lower until the 1990s.  The peaks, which tended 
to occur at the ends of expansions, are also successively lower until the 1990s except for 
the 1975-83 period.     9
The volatility of the 1970’s does support a role for monetary policy in the Great 
Moderation, but not the one emphasized by the adherents of that view.  It suggests that 
policy mistakes during that decade may have contributed to increased volatility, and an 
interruption in the longer-term trend toward reduced volatility.  The cessation of those 
mistakes (whether from a regime change or from the dissipation of the shocks of the early 
1970s), and a return to policies more resembling those of the 1950’s and early 1960’s, 
may have allowed volatility simply to return to its previous trend.  This gave the 
appearance of a large drop in volatility, but only because volatility’s downward march 
had been temporarily suspended.  Whatever factors were in motion over the postwar 
period to reduce volatility over time were continuing, and in time, after the disruptions of 
the 1970’s, reasserted their dominance. 
  So to summarize, the case for an important role for monetary policy in the Great 
Moderation is not helped substantially by the apparent suddenness of the drop in 
volatility in the early 1980s.  This is both because it is at least questionable whether 
monetary policy had a sudden break with its past, and because the drop in volatility was 
not as discrete or sudden as it appears, but in fact had been ongoing until interrupted in 
the 1970’s.  Monetary policy may have inadvertently contributed to the Great Moderation 
by adding to volatility in the 1970’s before some combination of the economic 
environment and policy itself reverted to something resembling earlier times.  A 
persuasive case for a more positive role for would require (a) distinguishing how policy 
in the post-1983 period was distinctive from both the policies of the 1970’s and the 
1950’s; and (b) a model that predicts the changed monetary policy would have a disparate 
impact on sectoral volatility, and on inventory behavior. 
  
V. Changes in Micro Volatility 
A.  Firm-Level Volatility in Sales and Employment Growth Rates 
Several recent studies find a secular rise in volatility among publicly traded firms.
5  
Prominent examples include Comin and Philippon (2005) and Comin and Mulani (2006).  
                                                 
5 Here, “publicly traded” refers to firms with equity securities listed on a stock exchange or traded in over-
the-counter markets.  As a practical matter, given the heavy reliance on COMPUSTAT for research in this 
area, “publicly traded” means firms that are also in COMPUSTAT, which has reasonably comprehensive 
coverage of publicly traded firms since the addition of NASDAQ listings in 1973.     10
Figure 8 replicates a key finding from these two studies.  It shows that the cross-sectional 
average of firm-level volatility in sales and employment growth rates roughly doubled 
from the early 1960s to the late 1990s.
6  This type of evidence persuaded many observers 
that business-level volatility rose sharply in recent decades, in glaring contrast to the big 
drop in aggregate volatility.  Evidence of rising variability in firm-level equity returns, 
discussed below, seemed to provide independent support for this view.  
It turns out, however, that the volatility trend among all firms displays a dramatically 
different pattern than the one in Figure 8.  To develop evidence on this issue, Davis et al. 
(2006) exploit the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), which covers all tax-paying 
businesses in the nonfarm private sector of the U.S. economy.
7  Using LBD employment 
data, they first confirm a strong rise in average volatility among publicly traded firms, 
broadly in line with results from COMPUSTAT data.  They then repeat the same 
volatility calculations for all firms, publicly traded and privately held alike, and find a 
40% decline in firm volatility from 1982 to 1996.  
Figure 9 reproduces a key figure in Davis et al. (2006), showing the average volatility 
of employment growth rates for publicly traded, privately held, and all firms.
8  Volatility 
is high and declining for privately held firms, low and rising for publicly traded firms.  In 
other words, there is strong move toward “volatility convergence” between publicly 
traded and privately held firms.  The same pattern holds for the volatility of establishment 
growth rates, although the movements over time are smaller.  The volatility convergence 
phenomenon also occurs within all major industry groups, as seen in Table 2.  As this 
table indicates, the volatility convergence pattern in Figure 9 does not arise from different 
industry distributions for publicly traded and privately held firms.  
So why does the volatility trend among publicly traded firms depart so much from the 
overall trend?  At one level, the answer is simple: publicly traded firms account for less 
than one-third of private sector employment, so there is much room for the trend among 
                                                 
6 Firm-level volatility is calculated from COMPUSTAT data as a moving ten-year window on the standard 
deviation of firm growth rates.  The volatility measure is limited to firm-level observations for which a ten-
year window is available.  Thus, entry, exit and short-lived firms are excluded.   
7 Access to the LBD is available to non-Census personnel for approved projects through the Center for 
Economic Studies at Census Bureau facilities in Suitland, Maryland and through one of several Census 
Research Data Centers operating at various locations.  See www.ces.census.gov for more information. 
8 Figure 9 shows results for a modified volatility measure that captures entry, exit and short-lived firms, and 
that does not require the deletion of observations near sample end points.     11
publicly traded firms to depart from the overall trend.  Digging deeper reveals another, 
more interesting, answer: There was a pronounced shift in the economic selection process 
governing entry into the set of publicly traded firms, and this shift greatly affected 
volatility trends among publicly traded firms.   
To see this, it is important to first recognize the large influx of newly listed firms in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  Fama and French (2004) report that the number of new lists 
(mostly IPOs) on major U.S. stock markets jumped from 156 per year in 1973-1979 to 
549 per year in 1980-2001.  Remarkably, about 10% of listed firms are new each year 
from 1980 to 2001.  Davis et al. (2006) report that firms newly listed in the 1980s and 
1990s account for about 40% of employment among all publicly traded firms by the late 
1990s.  So the influx of new lists in the 1980s and 1990s is large in number and 
eventually accounts for a large share of activity.   
Second, Fama and French (2004), among others, also provide evidence that new 
listings are riskier than seasoned public firms by a variety of measures, and that they 
become increasingly risky relative to seasoned firms after 1979.  Likewise, Davis et al. 
(2006, Figure 11) find higher volatility of employment growth rates for publicly traded 
firms that first list in the 1980s and 1990s.  Taken together, these results point to the 
influx of successively riskier and more volatile cohorts as an important source of the 
upward volatility trend among publicly traded firms.   
To quantify the contribution of these cohort effects to the volatility trend for publicly 
traded firms, Davis et al. use a regression approach. They first fit a weighted least squares 
regression of firm-level volatility on year dummies in COMPUSTAT data, with weights 
proportional to firm size.  The fitted year effects trace out the time path of firm-level 
volatility, and the difference between year effects ( ) ˆ y ∆ gives the change in volatility 
between two points in time.  To quantify the percentage of the volatility change 
accounted for by cohort effects, they then expand the regression to include one-year 
cohort dummies (year of first listing) and consider the change in estimated year effects 
with cohort controls() ˆ
CC y ∆ .  Lastly, they calculate the percentage of the volatility change 
accounted for by cohort effects as  ( ) ˆˆ ˆ 100 / .
CC yy y ∆ −∆ ∆  According to this calculation, 
simple cohort effects alone account for 67% of the volatility rise among publicly traded   12
firms from 1978 to 2001.  In contrast, analogous calculations for size, age and industry 
effects – separately or in combination – account for little of the volatility rise among 
publicly traded firms. 
B.  Firm-Level Variability in Equity Returns 
An influential paper by Campbell et al. (2001) documents a large upward trend in the 
volatility of firm-level equity returns for U.S. common stocks.  Specifically, they find 
that the variance of firm-level returns in daily data more than doubles from 1962 to 1997.  
They also show that the trend increase in firm-level return volatility reflects a rise in the 
volatility of the idiosyncratic, firm-specific component.  These findings stimulated 
several investigations into the reasons for the rise in the volatility of firm-level equity 
returns and its implications.
9   
As we discussed above, Fama and French (2004) document a large influx of newly 
listed firms, increasingly risky public firms in the 1980s and 1990s.  Based on their 
review of the evidence, they conclude that this upsurge of new listings explains much of 
the trend increase in idiosyncratic stock return volatility documented by Campbell et al. 
(2001).  They also suggest that there was a decline in the cost of equity that allowed 
weaker firms and those with more distant payoffs to issue public equity.  A more recent 
study by Brown and Kapadia (2007) reaches even stronger conclusion.  Using a 
regression methodology similar to the one described above, they find that “there is 
generally no significant trend in idiosyncratic risk after accounting for the year a firm 
lists.”  They also provide other evidence that firm-specific risks in the economy as a 
whole did not increase, even though the volatility of firm-level equity returns rose 
because of an influx of successively riskier cohorts.  Hence, the evidence and conclusions 
in Brown and Kapadia mirror those in Davis et al. (2006). 
C.  The Risk of Job Loss 
As discussed at length in Davis (2007), a wide variety of labor market indicators 
point to a secular decline in the risk of job loss.  These indicators include unemployment 
inflows by experienced workers in the Current Population Survey (CPS), the three-year 
job-loss rate in the CPS Displaced Worker Survey, several measures for the gross rate of 
                                                 
9 Brandt, Brav and Graham (2005) find that the volatility in firm-level equity returns turned down after 
2001.  Our Figure 9 suggests that firm-level volatility in employment growth rates also turned down after 
the late 1990s.    13
job destruction, the number of workers involved in mass layoff events, and the number of 
new claims for unemployment insurance benefits.  All of these indicators point to a 
secular decline in the risk of job loss, although the extent and timing of the decline differs 
among the indicators.  Figure 10 provides an example, showing a dramatic decline in new 
claims for unemployment insurance benefits as a percent of covered employment.   
CPS data also show a dramatic decline since the early 1980s in unemployment 
inflows as a percentage of employment.  Both indicators point to a large decline in the 
incidence of unwanted job loss.  Davis et al. (2007) provide evidence that about half of 
the long term decline in unemployment inflow rates is explained by the reduction in the 
gross job destruction rates and in the volatility of firm-level growth rates.  Hence, their 
study provides evidence of a direct link between the secular declines in firm-level 
volatility in Figure 9 and the secular declines in the incidence of job loss. 
  
D.  Consumption and Earnings Uncertainty 
Based on the evidence of large secular declines in firm-level volatility and the risk of 
unwanted job loss, one might expect to also see a decline in the volatility of individual 
earnings and household-level consumption changes.  Indeed, many laid-off workers 
experience large and persistent earnings losses, apparently as a direct consequence of job 
loss (e.g., Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan, 1993). However, the large body of work on 
earnings inequality suggests otherwise.  This line of research has clearly established a 
large rise in earnings inequality since the early 1980s.  See Lemieux (2007) for a recent 
review. It seems highly likely that greater earnings uncertainty accounts for a nontrivial 
portion of the large rise in earnings inequality.  
Cunha and Heckman (2007) estimate the contribution of earnings uncertainty to the 
rise in earnings inequality.  Their method uses data on schooling choices in combination 
with data on earnings outcomes to decompose the realized variance of earnings into 
predictable and unpredictable components.  They estimate that roughly a quarter of the 
rise in the present value of earnings uncertainty between ages 22 and 36 is due to 
components that are not forecastable.  
Another approach to quantifying changes in individual and household uncertainty 
exploits data on consumption expenditures. Gobachev (2007) uses data from the Panel   14
Study of Income Dynamics on food expenditures to estimate the volatility of household 
consumption after controlling for predictable variation associated with movements in real 
interest rates and changes in family structure.  Discuss Gorbachev results here. 
We take a simple approach to consumption volatility using data from the interview 
segment of the Consumer Expenditure Survey.  This survey contains up to four 
consecutive observations on quarterly household-level consumption expenditures. We 
measure consumption volatility in terms of absolute log changes in household 
consumption expenditures per adult equivalent on nondurables goods and services.  Our 
measure of adult equivalents is 1.0 times the first adult plus 0.7 times each additional 
adult in the same consumer unit plus 0.5 times each child in the consumer unit.   
We sort households each year into deciles of predicted consumption based on a 
regression of log expenditures per adult equivalent on sex of the household head, a 
quartic polynomial in the head’s age, four educational attainment categories, marital 
status of the head, interview month, and employment status of the head and the head’s 
spouse, if there is one.  We perform this sort based on the first interview with 
consumption expenditures for the consumer unit.  After sorting households into deciles, 
we then compute the mean value of the absolute log changes in each consumption decile 
for the 1980 to 1991 and 1992 to 2004 periods.  Figure 11 shows the results for the 6-
month absolute log changes.  The results are similar for 3-month and 9-month absolute 
log changes. 
Figure 11 shows two main results.  First, consumption volatility rises with the level of 
(predicted) consumption beyond the first three or four deciles of the consumption 
distribution.  Second, there is no evidence for a decline in consumption volatility after the 
1980s. In fact, the evidence in Figure 11 points to a modest increase in household-level 
consumption volatility except at the lower end of the consumption distribution.  Of 
course, with these data we cannot rule out the possibility that consumption volatility was 
greater before the 1980s. 
E.  Summary of Micro Volatility Evidence and Implications 
Based on our discussion and review of the evidence for changes in micro-level 
volatility, we draw the following conclusions:   15
1.  The volatility of firm-level employment growth rates fell after the early to mid 
1980s.  The decline in average firm-level volatility is similar in magnitude to the 
decline in aggregate volatility, but the timing differs.  Although we did not 
discuss it here, the volatility of state-level employment growth rates also fell after 
the 1980s (Carlino et al., 2007). 
2.  Among publicly traded firms, the volatility in real activity and in equity returns 
rose sharply after the early 1980s.  This volatility rise among publicly traded firms 
is a striking phenomenon, but it mainly or entirely reflects shifts in the selection 
process governing which firms become public.  Volatility trended in opposite 
direction among publicly traded and privately held firms in every major industry 
group. 
3.  Hence, considerable care is required when drawing inferences about the sources 
and nature of The Great Moderation from data on equity returns, or on any data 
limited to publicly traded firms.     
4.  Declines in firm-level volatility and gross job destruction rates are closely linked 
to declines in the risk of unwanted job loss, as reflected in sharply lower 
unemployment inflows after the early 1980s.  In this respect, data on aggregate 
volatility, average firm-level volatility, job destruction rates and the incidence of 
unemployment all point to a much more quiescent economic environment since 
the early 1980s. 
5.  However, data on labor earnings and household consumption do not conform to a 
story of greater tranquility and lower uncertainty at the individual level.  Although 
there is much room for further research, the available evidence suggests a modest 
to large increase in individual and household uncertainty. 
6.  Assuming this assessment of volatility in consumption growth and earnings 
uncertainty holds up under further scrutiny, it highlights a puzzle that research on 
The Great Moderation has yet to confront.  To wit: Why has the dramatic decline 
in the volatility of aggregate real activity, and the roughly coincident decline in 
firm-level volatility, not translated into sizable reductions in the degree of (pre-
tax) earnings uncertainty and consumption volatility facing individuals and 
households?       16
 
VI.  Improved Inventory Control 
A. A Closer Look at Durable Goods and Inventories 
    As discussed above, since the early 1980’s there have been a number of 
significant changes in the behavior of inventories in aggregate data. Here we focus on the 
durable goods sector, where, as we have seen, the most dramatic declines in output 
volatility have occurred, and where we have already seen evidence of a change in 
inventory behavior as discussed in Section III.  The reader is referred to Kahn et al. 
(2002) for a discussion of inventory behavior in the nondurable goods sector.  McCarthy 
and Zakrajsek (2007) examine the behavior of manufacturing sector inventories pre- and 
post-1983. 
While the inventory literature has traditionally focused on more disaggregated 
data, and in particular on the 2-digit (SIC) level manufacturing data, for the questions 
examined in this paper aggregate data has some distinct advantages. Disaggregated data 
can be misleading because it is impossible to tell whether changes in inventory behavior 
are genuine or just the result of economically (relatively) meaningless relocation.  For 
example, if manufacturers decide to shift final goods inventories downstream to 
wholesalers and retailers, or shift materials inventories upstream to their suppliers, 
manufacturing inventories would decline relative to their shipments.  Yet that decline 
would be largely offset by an increase in inventories elsewhere in the economy, and a 
mere re-labeling would get misinterpreted as evidence of a structural change. 
In addition to the indirect evidence of changing inventory behavior described in 
Section III, we can directly examine the inventory-sales ratio in the durable goods sector.  
Figure 12 shows that whether one looks at the ratio of real (in year 2000 dollars) 
inventories to real sales, or nominal to nominal, the ratio began a sharp declined in the 
early 1980s, at the same time that volatility in the sector declined. This is not by itself a 
proof of "progress;" it could just represent a shift along a fixed technological tradeoff in 
response to changing costs, or a compositional change within the sector.  But the timing 
of the break in trend is striking. 
Secondly, the inventory-sales ratio is clearly less volatile (relative to its varying 
trend), suggesting that businesses either make smaller mistakes or are able to correct their   17
inventories more quickly.  Again this is not definitive as it could be that the shocks are 
smaller or that the industry composition has shifted.  Kahn et al. (2002) also describes 
results from a VAR with sales and inventories that indicates a change in the variance 
decomposition pre- and post-1983.  Before 1983 sales accounted for much more of the 
variance of inventories than inventories did of sales (37.8 percent versus 5.4 percent); 
after 1983 they were almost even (18.2 versus 14.9), consistent with the idea that firms 
were better able to anticipate sales and adjust inventories in advance.  Moreover, the 
residual variance of sales dropped precipitously, meaning that less of the variation in 
sales was unpredicted given prior sales and inventories.  
 
B. A Model of Improved Inventory Control 
One approach to assessing the role of improved inventory control is to be agnostic 
about the details, but look for changes in parameters and propagation in, for example, a 
structural VAR.  This is the approached in McCarthy and Zakrajsek (2007).  They do find 
evidence of structural change pre- and post-1983.  They use conventional identifying 
restrictions in an effort sort out the role of, for example, monetary policy in altering the 
dynamics of the sales process.    
A second approach is a more specific model of improved inventory control  as in 
Kahn et al (2002), based on the approach in Kahn (1986) and Bils and Kahn (2000).  
Firms carry finished goods inventories to avoid stockouts in the face of uncertain 
demand, trading off the cost of foregone profits against the cost of carrying inventories.   
If demand is serially correlated, the mistakes will get magnified in production volatility, 
so that it will exceed the volatility of sales.  If technology enables firms to have better 
information about demand disturbances, then they will make smaller errors in their 
production decisions, and the additional volatility induced by correcting those errors is 
reduced.  Firms may also be able to hold fewer inventories.   
This type of mechanism can account for reduced production volatility (relative to 
the volatility of sales), but has several drawbacks.  First, depending on the timing of the 
arrival of information, either the volatility of sales actually increases substantially, or the 
covariance of sales with inventory investment increases.  As we have seen, the opposite is 
the case in the data.  The reason sales volatility increases in this model is that the   18
improved information essentially allows firms to accommodate demand shocks as 
opposed to damping them via stockouts.  The covariance of sales and inventory 
investment only becomes more negative if the firm gets the information in time to adjust 
production sufficiently in advance (due to a desire to smooth production if costs are 
convex) that inventory movements anticipate the demand shock.  Then when the shock 
occurs, inventory investment moves in the opposite direction, as anticipated by the firm.  
But this tends to exacerbate sales volatility. 
The second problem with this approach is that it does not apply so obviously or 
directly to the durable goods sector, much of which is best characterized as production-
to-order rather than production-to-stock.  And as pointed out by Humphries et al  (2001) 
and many others, most inventories, particularly in durable goods, are of materials or 
works in process, not final goods.  Third, while there is much anecdotal evidence of 
technology that might provide better information about future sales, there is no direct 
evidence to assist in specifying a model.  And as this discussion suggests, the details 
matter. 
A variation on this approach that appears to address these problems is in Kahn 
(2007).  Firms are production-to-order, and must order materials at least one period in 
advance.  For simplicity (to avoid having to track three different stocks), materials are 
immediately converted into works-in-process inventories.  Stockouts occur in these 
inventories if they are insufficient to allow the firm to meet its (stochastic) orders, in 
which case the order gets added to the stock of unfilled orders.  The setup is illustrated in 
Figure 12 as a flowchart. 
 Details of the model are provided in an Appendix.  It is obviously, as is any 
model, a vast oversimplification.  In reality, production can involve many more stages, 
and many suppliers—both internal and external to the firm—at different stages.  Of 
course, although it is modeled as a single firm, it could easily be applied to a vertically 
non-integrated supply chain where the two stages of production are done by different 
firms.  Thus the model is consistent with the argument of Irvine and Schuh (2005) that 
attribute substantial reduced volatility reduced comovement between the manufacturing 
and trade sectors.  In any case, the hope is that the model captures the essential features 
of reality while avoiding unnecessary complexity.   19
The intuition for how the model works is similar to that of the stockout-avoidance 
approach from Kahn (1986) described above.  Orders for final goods are serially 
correlated, so errors in forecasting demand get magnified in production (sales plus 
inventory investment) volatility.  The key difference is that final production is equal to 
sales, so if the firm is better able to forecast orders, the reduced volatility of production 
that comes from that may also reduce the volatility of sales.  The other effect, that fewer 
stockouts means that the firm better accommodates demand shocks, is still present, but 
for reasonable parameters, as we shall see, the former effect dominates. 
So this model immediately addresses all but one of the objections raised above.  It 
is specifically tailored to characteristics of the durable goods sector in that it assumes 
production-to-order rather than production to stock.  It features works-in-process rather 
than final goods inventories.  It has the property that better information about final orders 
has the potential to reduce the volatility of both output and sales, the former more than 
the latter.   
The remaining issue is evidence for specifying how the firm is better able to 
forecast orders.  Here we rely on evidence obtained from the Institute of Supply 
Management on average lead times for orders of production materials.  This is imperfect 
evidence, as it is not confined to the durable goods sector, but it is striking nonetheless.  
The series is depicted in Figure 13, plotted against the volatility (5-year rolling variance) 
of output volatility in durable goods.  While the average lead time series does not exhibit 
the underlying downward trend of the volatility series, it does feature a clear drop in level 
post-1983 relative to earlier.  It also shows some elevation in the 1970s.  
What is the connection between shorter lead times and better information?  In the 
model, the essential information for the firm on which it bases its forecast of future final 
goods orders is the history of observed final goods orders.  So the longer it can delay 
materials orders, the better handle it has on how much to order.   Consequently the 
mistakes are smaller, and the firm can carry lower average stocks.  
Of course, what allows for shorter lead times is not modeled, but taken as direct 
evidence of technical progress.   Given that the goal of the so-called “just-in-time” 
approach is greater flexibility to reduce the need to carry large stocks, this is reasonable, 
but may only be part of the story.  For example, some of the increased lead times in the   20
1970s could have been the result of the Nixon-era price controls, which created shortages 
and frictions in materials.  It would be natural for firms concerned about not being able to 
obtain materials in a given time frame to order farther in advance.  This does not negate 
the mechanism in the model, it just says that something other than technical progress may 
be behind some sustained movements in average lead times.  It may well be that price 
controls, or even the high inflation of the 1970s, could have disrupted market signals and 
caused some of the increased lead times, and hence the increased volatility, but this 
hypothesis awaits further research. 
There is little doubt that vast resources have been devoted to improving what is 
generally referred to as “supply chain management.”  How this translates into observable 
behavior and data is another question entirely.  As Mentzer et al (2001) write:   
 
“Despite the popularity of the term Supply Chain Management, both in 
academia and practice, there remains considerable confusion as to its meaning.  
Some authors define SCM in operational terms involving the flow of materials 
and products, some view it as a management philosophy, and some view it in 
terms of a management process.”  
 
They go on to define the term as “the systemic, strategic coordination of the traditional 
business functions and the tactics across these business functions within a particular 
company and across businesses within the supply chain, for the purposes of improving 
the long-term performance of the individual companies and the supply chain as a whole.”  
While this definition is vague, it is clearly intended to encompass a number of specifics, 
notably what they refer to as a logistics system: “the total flow of materials, from the 
acquisition of raw materials to delivery of finished products, to the ultimate users, as well 
as the related counter-flows of information that both control and record material 
movement.  
  The strong prediction of the model is that a reduction in lead times, for any 
reasonable parameters, gives rise to a large reduction in output volatility and a somewhat 
smaller reduction in the volatility of final sales.  While the magnitudes of these declines 
depend on specifics such as the average inventory-sales ratio (which is endogenous in the 
model and depends on price-cost markups and inventory holding costs) and the ratios of 
inputs to gross output at each stage of production, the qualitative results only require   21
some degree of persistence in the final goods orders process.  Table 3 gives the results of 
a representative simulation.  The model easily matches the basic facts about reduced 
volatility in the durable goods sector:  Initially production volatility exceeds sales 
volatility by a lot.  Subsequently, both volatilities go down, but production volatility 
declines by much more than sales volatility. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
[to be added] 
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The technology is as follows: 
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where we take β , p, q, and w as fixed and exogenous, with p sufficiently large that the 
markup is positive.  Consequently, firms will always seek to fill all unfilled orders, so we 
have 
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The first condition says that the firm fills its unfilled orders if it can, otherwise it stocks 
out of works-in-process inventories.  The second condition is the implication of the first 
for the usage of works-in-process inventories. 
  Beginning with the easier case of  1 τ = , we have 
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where κ  depends on the distribution of  ti t v η + , the markup, and the discount factor.  
Specifically, if we let c stand in for the cost of producing a unit of output, κ  comes from 
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The idea is that the firm takes into account what it already is carrying over in works-in-
process, and orders what it expects to use, plus a factor κ  that reflects uncertainty and 
the relative costs and benefits of stocking out versus carrying extra inventory.   
 If  2 τ =  we get something analogous: 
  { } ( ) { } 22 2 1 tt M F t t t t DZ bb EU E M κ −− − − ⎡ ⎤ ′ == + − ⎣ ⎦  
where κκ ′ ≠  (typically it will be larger) and depends on the distribution of   ti t v η +  and 
11 ti t v η −− +  in addition to the markup and discount rate.  Again the firm orders what it 
expects, to need, but with less information than when  1 τ = .   24
  With some straightforward and not so straightforward algebraic manipulations, 
and applications of the law of iterated expectations, we can show that shipments and total 
output (shipments plus the change in inventories) behave as follows: 
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Finally, we can aggregate by integrating over the firms’ idiosyncratic risk v.  Supposing v 
is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 
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A similar exercise provides analogous results for the  2 τ =  case.  These form the basis for 
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Table 1: Impact of Sectoral Shifts on Volatility Declines 
  GDP Growth  GDP Growth  
(1959 sector shares) 
1947Q1-1983Q4 4.07  4.28 
1984Q1-2007Q2 2.10  2.53 
  *Standard deviations of annualized growth rates 
 
Table 2. Firm Volatility Trends by Major Industry Group and Ownership Status 
 
 
Notes: Firm-level volatility calculated per equation (6) in Davis et al. (2006).  
Average volatility across firms computed on an employment-weighted basis. 
 




Table 3: Simulation Results 
  Standard deviations of 
  Output  Sales  Output growth  Sales growth 
2 τ =   3.38 2.59  7.43  3.39 
1 τ =   2.54 2.32  3.65  1.93 
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Notes: Firm-level volatility computed as a moving ten-year window on the 
standard deviation of firm-level growth rates.  Average volatility across firms 
computed on an unweighted or weight basis, as indicated. 
 
Source: Calculations on COMPUSTAT data by Davis et al. (2006). Figure 9: Volatility in Firm-Level Employment Growth Rates,  
Overall and by Ownership Status, 1978 to 2001 
 
 
Notes: Firm-level volatility calculated as a ten-year weighted moving average of 
growth rates, inclusive of entry and exit and with a degrees-of-freedom 
correction.  See equation (6) in Davis et al. (2006).  Average volatility across 
firms computed on an employment-weighted basis. 
 
Source: Calculations on the Longitudinal Business Database by Davis et al. 
(2006). Figure 10. Weekly New Claims for Unemployment Insurance as a 































Source: Calculations by Davis (2007) using seasonally adjusted data on unemployment insurance weekly claims and total nonfarm emplyment data in the Current 
Employment Survey.   1
Figure 11: Household Consumption Volatility by Decile of Predicted Consumption, 
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Figure 13 
 
 